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Transitional Justice and the Quality of Democracy
Anja Mihr, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Utrecht University, the Netherland
Transitional Justice is a long-term process which seeks to address severe human rights abuses of the past through measures such as trials, commissions of in-
quiry, memorials, apologies, reforms of the legal or security sector, school textbook reforms, and reconciliation projects. These measures are usually applied by 
governments, but can also be initiated by civil society groups, such as victim groups, or the international community, for example the European Union or the 
UNHCR. Transitional justice measures are seen as catalysts for coming to terms with the past and establishing new, stable, and often democratic societies. As 
such, the measures are linked to the performance and efficacy of democratic institutions in the context of their accountability and responsiveness, trans-
parency, and level of citizen participation. Thus, transitional justice is a process that aims to reconcile divided and conflict-torn societies by re-establishing 
(democratic) institutions. These measures can be catalysts to leverage institutional performance.
This article looks at the relationship between transitional 
justice measures and the quality of democracy. According 
to the definition used by UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights this process consists of both judicial and 
non-judicial mechanisms, including prosecution initiatives, 
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, or a com-
bination of these measures. Whatever combination is 
chosen must be in conformity with international legal stan-
dards, including international human rights and state obli-
gations to protect and promote them. The International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) defines transitional 
justice as an approach seeking to achieve justice by a set of 
judicial and non-judicial measures implemented in order 
to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses. 
These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth com-
missions, reparations programs, lustrations, memorials, 
and various kinds of institutional reforms.
In this context, transitional justice measures are seen over a 
period of time as catalysts to enhance democratic perform-
ance by increasing accountability, transparency, or par-
ticipation of, among, and with democratic institutions, and 
consequently strengthening and legitimizing them. Never-
theless, these measures can also be misused and carried out 
by political leaders or interest groups with a bias or politi-
cal interest. This can, in return, hamper or weaken the per-
formance of democratic institutions through corruption, 
victor’s justice, or trials which privilege side one over the 
other. I will link these dimensions and explore the possible 
impact that different transitional justice measures have on 
democracy.
1. Transitional Justice and Democracy
The main objectives of transitional justice measures are to 
attain peace and societal stability within a conflict-torn 
society through means of justice and truth. In order to do 
so, the country’s political and bureaucratic institutions 
must guarantee a basic level of accountability, trans-
parency, and free participation. When and how to apply 
these mechanisms depends on the context of the conflict 
and on the post-conflict situation. For example, seeking 
justification for war crimes is a central concern in war-torn 
societies shortly after the conflict has ended, whereas a 
focus on investigating the collaborative communist elite 
has been the focal point in post-authoritarian states in 
Eastern Europe over a longer period of time. Ultimately, 
IJCV : Vol. 7 (2) 2013, pp. XXX – XXX
Anja Mihr: Transitional Justice and the Quality of Democracy 300
transitional justice measures aim to support governmental 
efforts to delegitimize the previous regime and political 
elite while legitimizing and strengthening the new regime 
(Priban, Roberts, and Young 2003). I focus on both parallel 
processes.
Recent studies have shown that when transitional justice 
measures are applied separately, rather than in com-
bination with other measures or in a set, they have little 
impact. A combination of transitional justice measures 
applied over an extended period, as recommended by the 
UN (ten years or a generation and longer), are the most 
likely to impact on the quality of democratic processes and 
institutional performance (Van der Merwe, Baxter, and 
Chapman 2009; Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2010). Moreover, it 
is important to note that not all measures are suitable to be 
applied at any given time, for instance directly after a con-
flict has ended.
Quality of democracy is an emerging sub-field of democ-
racy studies introduced by Morlino and IDEA in the late 
1990s (Diamond and Morlino 2005). Assessment of the 
quality of democratic institutions focuses accountability, 
transparency, and participation (good governance prin-
ciples) and how these principles are interlinked with 
measures of transitional justice (Graham, Amos, and 
Plumptre 2003).
Therefore, in order to assess the quality of democracy with 
respect to transitional justice, it is necessary to look at the 
reactions of political and civic institutions, organizations, 
and actors such as lawyers, policy makers, and civil society 
groups involved in the long-term process of democratiz-
ation as well as the process of transitional justice. Govern-
ment (executive), parliament (legislative), and the 
judiciary, as well as the electorate and civil society, interact 
through these processes and transitional justice measures 
can catalyze their interests and interaction with citizens.
1.1. Inter-linkage between Transitional Justice and Democratic 
Institutions
When we assess transitional justice measures or “tools,” 
alongside the principles that indicate the quality of democ-
racy and its institutions, such as accountability through 
responsiveness and transparency or civic trust through par-
ticipation, we look for certain criteria such as trust through 
civic interaction with democratic institutions and the 
application of the rule of law through the judiciary. The 
conversion of these standards into policies can help deter-
mine to what extent transitional justice measures enact 
legal reforms to punish or purge perpetrators, compensate 
survivors, and acknowledge victims, bystanders, and 
society at large. To measure the link between transitional 
justice measures and quality of democracy we look at the 
level of accountability, for example government respon-
siveness to the claims and needs of citizens, victims, or per-
petrators for compensation, reparation or fair trials. To 
identify the level of transparency, we look at the level of 
compliance with international human rights law, for 
example equity rights, during trials or vetting procedures. 
The level of participation and engagement by citizens and 
civil society in the decision-making process can indicate 
the level of civic trust in democratic institutions. Overall, it 
is the level of accountability or responsiveness of govern-
mental institutions towards citizens’ and other inter-
national demands that indicates whether democratic 
institutions are performing well. The level of citizens’ civic 
trust and engagement also indicates the level of legitimacy 
of democratic institutions and their actors (Mayer-Rickh 
and Greiff 2007, 501). Transitional justice measures, such 
as commissions of inquiry, vetting procedures, trials, or 
memorials, can serve as a catalysts to channel such claims 
and respond to public pressure. The same applies when 
inaugurating a memorial, issuing laws on lustration, or set-
ting up trials: all these measures can serve as tools to lever-
age democratic performance. This can increase the level of 
effective governance and thus the quality of democracy, for 
example if citizen-driven pressure persuades the govern-
ment to respond by holding an open parliamentary debate 
about past injustice, changing laws, or engaging more of 
civil society in the democratic process.
By and large, we have seen governments in Germany, Chile, 
South Korea, and South Africa use different measures to 
shape their democratic institutions. Issues of past wrong-
doing often come onto the political agenda during election 
processes or at national anniversaries, for example German 
or South Korean commemorations of the end of World 
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War II or in post-Apartheid South Africa. During such 
commemorations and election campaigns, political actors 
and stakeholders reference the past and often call for more 
or different transitional justice measures to deal with it. By 
doing so, they make concessions to dealing with the past, 
and open doors for first, albeit often singular transitional 
justice measures. Nonetheless, such concessions indicate 
that the past has a direct link to present political perform-
ance or culture. Some countries, like Germany, Spain, or 
Argentina amnestied perpetrators to gratify a certain con-
stituency and electorate during transition. Amnesty laws 
are seen as a transitional justice measure of last resort. 
They can however, be seen as a stabilizing measure 
immediately after the end of dictatorship or war, as was the 
case in post-Franco Spain in 1976 and 1977 or in post-war 
Germany after 1949. The aim of amnesties is to satisfy 
former political elites and prevent them returning to power 
through military or violent means (Roehrig 2009; Frei 
2002; Rigby 2000). Thus, amnesty laws are most likely to be 
passed if there as a real threat by the former elite – often 
militant – to seek power again soon after the conflict or 
regime has ended. Although amnesties do not necessarily 
hamper transitional justice processes, they can lead to a 
culture of impunity that in the long run makes a further 
transitional justice process impossible. But amnesty laws 
can also be overruled by constitutional court decisions, 
presidential decrees, or referendums, as occurred in some 
Latin American countries. Unsurprisingly, even decades 
after the conflict has ended, not all societies feel ready to 
abolish amnesty laws, fearing acts of vengeance or other 
repercussions by former perpetrators, for example in Tur-
key after 1980. Others, like Spain, simply fear social reper-
cussions in society at large, if the glorious mystery of their 
former state leader, General Franco, and his constituency 
and supporters (of which many have remained in powerful 
positions as judges or in ministries) were to be demystified.
During early transition processes and democratic institu-
tion-building, vote-winning majorities usually dominate 
the political and economic discourse in a liberal democracy. 
These majorities are not necessarily in favor of transitional 
justice measures, as was seen in many post-communist 
countries. In consensual democracies there is a greater like-
lihood that victim groups will be included in the decision-
making and democratization process at an earlier stage 
(Lijphard 1999). One of the reasons why the first years of 
transition challenge both transitional justice and democ-
racy measures is that many of those actors or new political 
elites who appear as fully-fledged democrats overnight 
actually have a long anti-democratic past, having supported 
the previous violent or autocratic regime, and consequently 
fear retributive measures. Obviously they have little interest 
in starting a transitional justice process to which they them-
selves might be subject, sooner or later. Liberal democratic 
concepts aim to privilege majority opinions in parliament 
and in legislative power structures. For societies in transi-
tion, this can mean that citizens vote for the previous elites 
who are the most outspoken: they know the “political 
game,” possess the largest resources for campaigning, and 
have an existing relationship with citizens in which voters 
“know what they are getting.” This is a common phenom-
enon in transitional societies, even if it means electing those 
who were largely responsible for previous atrocities, injus-
tices, and conflict. Other new political actors, sometimes 
victims of the previous regime or marginalized political 
groups, are often inexperienced in public campaigning and 
have little or no governance record. During ruptured tran-
sition processes, new governments oppose the inclusion of 
old elites and therefore advocate punitive transitional jus-
tice measures, as in Tunisia, which can lead to victor’s jus-
tice practices. In pacted transitions like in Spain, where old 
and new political elites govern side by side, transitional jus-
tice measures are more reluctantly applied and amnesties 
favored over retributive measures. Consequently, the com-
position of the new political elites or actors will predict 
whether, when, and why transitional justice measures are 
applied. A thoughtful combination of old and new elites is 
more likely to succeed than a complete shift in political 
leadership. Political institutions in consensual democracies 
focus more than those than in liberal democracies on 
citizens’ participation and inclusion, from which minorities 
(such as victim groups) benefit. Moreover, consensual 
democracies emphasize social justice, distribution of 
resources, long-term peace, and the common well-being of 
society (McGann 2006, 177). Hence, consensual democ-
racies are more responsive to their citizens’ demands and 
claims than liberal ones, since the latter rely more on the 
rule of law.
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1.2. Timing of Transitional Justice in Democracies
The impact of transitional justice measures largely depends 
on how political elites channel processes and deal with the 
past, but there is no set guide on when to start the process. 
What is certain is that where citizens’ claims exist, execu-
tive and legislative power should be responsive, as this will 
leverage institutional legitimacy and stability. The resulting 
quality of democracy also depends on how inclusive the 
process is. In this respect, Hazan points out that in conflict-
driven societies governments should first develop symbolic 
bonding systems between institutions and citizens without 
denying the past (Hazan 2006, 46–47). One must be mind-
ful that memory and remembrance are dynamic processes 
that should also permit forgetting. Equally, political actors 
should be aware that each generation reinterprets the 
events of the past. The first post-conflict generation, 
twenty to twenty-five years after the transition starts, is 
usually the first that is not afraid to institute thorough 
transitional justice measures. Needless to say, much of this 
early process depends on political leadership managing 
these reforms and institutions. Interestingly, we observe 
that after one generation, or twenty years into the demo-
cratic process, a new political generation, free from fear 
and responsibility for the past, raises stronger demands to 
come to terms with the past. This is also the time when in 
democratic societies at least a minimum of international 
human rights standards have been integrated into domestic 
legislation, a shift in political power has taken place 
through peaceful elections, and institutions have been sta-
bilized to a certain extent. This is a period where one is 
most likely to see whether transitional justice measures, 
such as trials or vetting procedures, have impacted these 
societies and led to more effective institutional reforms, for 
example changing military security laws into more liberal 
ones as was the case in West Germany in the 1970s, twenty-
five years after the country turned formally to democracy. 
Hence, it often takes at least a decade or two after the end 
of the abusive regime before all formal mechanisms are in 
place to allow democratic institutions to fully apply the 
whole spectrum of transitional justice measures based on 
international human rights law, as seen in post-World War 
II West Germany (Frei 2002). The first post-transition or 
post-conflict generation benefits most from these formal 
democratic reforms. They are free from guilt or fear of 
facing repercussions (from former military or political 
elites), because they do not bear any personal responsibility 
for the suppressive regime or war. Furthermore, authors 
like Hazan (2006) argue that unless there are effective 
monitoring procedures in place, such as an independent 
judiciary, transitional justice measures may prove inef-
fective and instead become a convenient alibi for inertia. 
Thus, monitoring institutions and a judiciary should be in 
place not only to ensure fair and open trials or commission 
of inquiry, but also to guarantee the safety and security of 
witnesses and accused. Institutional monitoring pro-
cedures, such as courts or commissions, may better facili-
tate democratic transition and enhance the quality of 
democratic institutions if they leave room for participation 
by societal and political actors from all sides that lead to 
various kinds of response by government institutions.
But in general old elites, authoritarian traditions, and 
bigotry dominate the political spectrum. Many of the “lib-
erators” from the past regime, such those as in Rwanda 
after 1994 or in Sierra Leone after 2000, had committed 
war crimes or human rights violations themselves. In our 
contemporary understanding, war criminals on the “win-
ning side” should also be brought to justice in the transi-
tional period. That was not always the case, and history 
shows that they are often exempt from prosecution and 
instead hold great political power (Peskin 2005; Biddiss 
1995). In fact, liberators or victors, such as Paul Kagame’s 
government in Rwanda, often use transitional justice 
measures to cleanse the political arena of personal oppo-
nents and political enemies, by purging them or imposing 
life imprisonment or the death penalty. Those new political 
elites have little or no interest in setting up the kind of 
inclusive transitional justice process with trials and com-
missions that would investigate all perpetrators alike, 
regardless of which side they were on. By failing to do so, 
they establish benefits for only one side and distort the dis-
tribution of blame (Vlaming 2012).
Consequently, at the beginning of any transition process 
transitional justice measures are often used as tools to set 
political agendas. Moral responsibility for atonement is not 
on the political agenda at first. Therefore, we find a 
number of transitional justice mechanisms applied in 
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autocracies, oligarchies, and democracies alike, that are 
principally used to delegitimize the previous regime and 
solidify autocratic power, but completely without the aim 
of improving the quality of democracy or democracy. Gov-
ernments in Russia and China, for example, use many of 
these transitional justice measures (anniversary commem-
orations, history commissions, or demands for apologies 
by former enemies) to manifest their own autocratic and 
anti-democratic power, based on the simple notion of good 
(victims) and bad (perpetrators). They use these measures 
to fuel hostile positions toward neighboring countries, 
such as Japan, in order to distract public attention from 
domestic problems (Andrieu 2011; Gready 2009, 184–85).
While many young, fragile democracies in transition are at 
risk of returning to authoritarian rule, they also have a 
unique opportunity to strengthen the rule of law and cre-
ate strong democratic institutions by using transitional jus-
tice measures. A traumatized and fearful society is often the 
deciding factor for the success or failure of transitional jus-
tice processes. The process can fail if the country has little 
experience with democratic institutions, the transitional 
justice measures are not carefully applied, and/or the new 
political elite is not fully committed to good governance 
principles (Kiss 2006). Traditional domestic, political, and 
civic conditions have to be taken into account as well. 
Hazan observes that unless there is a popular, national 
catharsis, which allows a substantial majority of population 
to agree that something has to be done about the past, 
transitional justice measures may not lead to the desired 
outcome. It may be useless to even begin the process if 
there is no overall agreement in society about dealing with 
the past (Linz and Stepan 1996, 5; Diamond 1999, 68). 
Thus, a national catharsis is fundamental to starting any 
transitional justice process, because it channels the com-
mon fears and different narratives that exist in society and 
opens doors to dealing with the past. Through the voicing 
of truth and narratives, for example, a national catharsis 
emerges. It allows a common history and narratives to be 
written of mutually exclusive and antagonistic memories 
and identities (Hazan 2006, 26). A catharsis does not define 
the measures yet it helps to initiate a dialogue between the 
different parties and between institutions and citizens – as 
was the case in the post-conflict peace process since 2010 in 
Cote d’Ivoire in which, according to the International 
Center for Transitional Justice and the UN, such a dialogue 
was a key step in the process of national catharsis through 
which the Ivorian people must recognize and accept the 
profound moral and political causes of the past violence 
and human rights violations and eradicate their long-term 
social, cultural, and psychological consequences (UN News 
Service, 13 August 2013). Nonetheless, the specific 
measures have to be chosen by political and civic elites, 
who decide which best serve the interests and rights of vic-
tims and victimizers alike. Most post-conflict societies 
experience such a national catharsis immediately after the 
conflict has ended, but it often exists for only a brief period 
of one year or less. This “window of opportunity” is a 
timespan for policymakers to address past wrongdoings 
and utilize the catharsis as a catalyst to institute legal or 
political reforms, i.e. through vetting or judicial pro-
cedures, often closes long before commissions of inquiry 
have completed their reports, trials have started, or demo-
cratic institutions have been established. Sometimes this 
“window” is shorter than one year, or up to five years. 
Instead, new outbreaks of violence are often the result 
(Quinn 2009). The window usually opens again when the 
first post-conflict generation gains political power.
2. Transitional Justice Measures as “Catalyst” for the Quality of 
Democracy
In its 2006 guiding principles for transitional justice the 
OHCHR concluded that transitional justice measures are a 
substantial factor in aiding democratization processes (UN 
Doc GA Resolution 60/147, 21 March 2006). But in order 
to work as such, the basic democratic institutions have to 
be in place, and the safety of perpetrators and victims has 
to be ensured. The UN guidelines emphasize that transi-
tional justice measures can achieve sustainable peace and 
justice as well as enhance democratic performance, but 
only if they are enforced through democratic institutions 
with wide civil-society participation, and that they should 
not be applied against the will of the citizens. Yet, I argue 
that many of these institutions can be re-installed and sta-
bilized – or destabilized – while using transitional justice 
measures as catalysts; for instance, the South African com-
mission of inquiry’s ability to create transparency and 
obtain a certain level of accountability and transparency 
IJCV : Vol. 7 (2) 2013, pp. XXX – XXX
Anja Mihr: Transitional Justice and the Quality of Democracy 304
that led to more engagement by citizens with these institu-
tions and thus a higher level of civic trust. Other domestic 
circumstances, political and legal cultures, and factors such 
as whether an independent judiciary is already in place, 
must also be taken into account (Davis 2010). International 
and regional organizations and institutions can facilitate, 
but not impose this process. The UN “Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guaran-
tees of non-recurrence” appointed in 2012 is one of many 
initiatives by the international community to monitor the 
implementation of transitional justice measures in post-
conflict and authoritarian societies under the conditions 
mentioned (Greiff 2012). For example, victims who receive 
reparations or compensation will invariably identify them-
selves with the democratic institutions of the new regime 
and thus promote the democratic process, while victims or 
perpetrator groups that have negative experiences with 
biased trials or unfair compensation issued through insti-
tutions, feel excluded. As a consequence, they often tend to 
act outside legal and political frameworks, as the resistance 
movement of campesinos in Colombia or the ongoing Hutu 
resistance to the government in Rwanda.
As a result, measures such as commissions of inquiry, his-
tory commissions, domestic or international trials, mem-
orials, or apologies can function as catalysts and a forum to 
take up violent claims or grievance wishes for vengeance. 
These measures hence catalyze claims and convert them, 
i.e. into reports, indictments, commemoration events, to 
which governmental institutions can respond, for example 
with compensation funds. By doing so, public institutions 
as well as the government or parliament respond and 
engage with citizens and vice versa. In return, citizens’ 
involvement leverages the performance of democratic 
institutions. This is how transitional justice measures can 
contribute to the quality of democracy.
Hence, these measures can help to turn false allegations, 
myths, conspiracy, silence, and mistrust into facts, figures, 
and notions that attain truth, transparency, and trust, 
which add invaluably to the process of achieving justice 
and democracy. These measures can prevent society at 
large from undertaking arbitrary acts of vengeance or viol-
ence and channel those desires toward more peaceful con-
flict resolution and transition. Citizens (re-)learn how to 
make use of institutions, petition parliamentarians and 
expect responses, or dare to file a claim without fearing 
repercussions. If citizens and victims see their claims 
addressed responsively, they are more likely to refrain from 
taking justice into their own hands through violent means. 
This is, thus, a stabilizing factor for conflict-torn societies. 
In this same context, Olson, Payne, and Reiter argue that 
applying only particular, exclusive transitional justice 
measures while leaving others out may have diminishing 
effects on sustainable democratic development (2010, 
141–45). Thus, if the demands of citizens are focused on 
memorials, vetting procedures, and trials, they should at 
least be addressed by governments and policy makers, and 
not ignored. But as Baxter highlights, different transitional 
justice measures impact different sectors of society (2009, 
325–26). Expectations of these measures range from those 
who wish to leave the past behind to those who cannot 
wait to see their oppressors punished. The variety and dis-
parity of interests must be carefully assessed and balanced, 
and this can pose a serious challenge to political actors 
when deciding what kind of transitional justice measures 
to apply.
Political and legal traditions as well as international and 
regional monitoring mechanisms, such as those operated 
by the Council of Europe, the Inter-American regime for 
human rights, or the African Union, also play an important 
role in this process. Just as, if there is no bottom-up 
approach by citizens there is no transitional justice process, 
the same is true where there is no external pressure and no 
incentives at all, either from the international community 
or from below from citizens’ movements. The less a 
country in transition can count on support, initiatives, or 
pressure from the international community, the less likely 
its political elites are to start the process. The same is true 
for a lack of popular pressure and truth-seeking initiatives. 
Governments often find themselves in a situation where 
they have to be accountable to the international commu-
nity as well as to local pressure groups (constituencies, vic-
tims’ groups, or electorate), and use the same transitional 
justice measures to be responsive to both. Installing com-
missions of inquiry, for examples, is a response to the 
pressure and indicates that they take the unresolved issues 
IJCV : Vol. 7 (2) 2013, pp. XXX – XXX
Anja Mihr: Transitional Justice and the Quality of Democracy 305
of the past seriously. At the same time democratic institu-
tions indicate a certain level of responsiveness and 
accountability which leads to more civic trust. In this situ-
ation, transitional justice mechanisms also must comply 
with constitutional and international human rights norms. 
At the same time, international courts like the ECtHR have 
taken Kurdish victim groups’ claims for reparations against 
the Turkish government as a trigger to also launch recom-
mendations and issue sentences against the government in 
Ankara. The government in return had to respond to these 
claims and sentences domestically and internationally. 
Pressure groups take the decisions of an international court 
as an incentive to pressure their government for further 
reforms. Consensual democracies may contest that claims 
have to be dealt with immediately, as in the case of the Jap-
anese government and the forced prostitution of the so 
called “comfort women” during World War II in Korea and 
China (Tanaka 2002). In this respect, I would argue that 
the pace and extent to which governments and parliaments 
respond to claims indicates the level of responsiveness and 
thus accountability. Governmental response to claims can 
take place at any stage of democratic development. There is 
no “punto final,” no “Schlussstrich,” as some politicians 
demanded in 1980s Latin America or post-World War II 
Germany (Roht-Arriaza 1998).
As the United Church of Canada’s apology to the First 
Nation People in recent years demonstrated, crimes and 
injustice can be addressed decades or even centuries after 
they occur. The value that transitional justice measures 
hold for all democratic institutions, old and new, is always 
the same: increased legitimacy. Often it takes a second or 
later generation of victims and descendants or bystanders 
to raise the issues of the past (Schabas and Bernaz 2012). 
In some cases international criminal justice and customary 
law apply without any strict time limitations. But if gov-
ernments fail to respond at all to these citizens’ claims 
without providing sufficient rationale, this represents a 
lack of accountability and thus effective and qualitative 
governance. Then, political unrest, civil disobedience, and 
turmoil may occur because citizens are unsatisfied. The 
moment a group puts an issue from the past on the politi-
cal agenda, the executive and legislative ought to respond 
in an open way.
Unsurprisingly, we find that transitional justice measures 
are more likely to be successfully applied in more stable 
democracies than in less stable ones. New democracies face 
serious constraints and political opposition that often 
allow them to focus on only one or two transitional justice 
measures and leave out others. They also fear negative con-
sequences for their new and fragile regime. New political 
elites who were in some way connected to the previous 
regime avoid holding trials as they fear being subject to 
prosecution themselves one day (Spinner-Halev 2012, 164).
In Rwanda, for example, almost all transitional justice 
measures have been applied through a top-down approach, 
but the quality of democracy is rather poor. In post-World 
War II West Germany, after an initial top-down approach 
in the 1950s, most transitional justice measures shifted to a 
more bottom-up approach just one generation later in the 
late 1960s and 1970s, and this did much to enhance the 
quality of democracy (Herf 1997). In Spain, some of the 
amnesty and compensation measures put into place 
immediately after the death of General Franco in 1975, i.e. 
by granting specific pensions to former political prisoners, 
might qualify as transitional justice measures. In particular, 
the amnesty laws of 1975–76 were regarded as blueprints 
for many other peaceful or pacted transition processes in 
the following decades. But no serious transitional justice 
processes took place in Spain until about 2000, when the 
first post-Franco generation went onto the streets and into 
the internet and social networks to form pressure groups 
and NGOs to demand more extensive measures such as a 
commission of inquiry, trials, memorials, and so on. These 
participatory demands by citizens triggered governmental 
response and transparency, and finally resulted in a “law of 
historical memory” in 2007. Nonetheless, Spanish democ-
racy is already considered to have consolidated in the 
1980s, ten years after regime change. But Spanish democ-
racy has transpired to be less resilient to political crises 
because old political elites kept many positions and were 
reluctant, for example, to pass reparation laws or listen to 
victims’ claims. To this day, institutional flaws, deficits, and 
“unconsolidated” pockets in democracies such as Spain, 
Greece, or Chile are often connected with past wrong-
doings and the unprocessed legacies of wars and dictator-
ships. Instead, the anti-democratic legacies and shadows of 
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past regimes often haunt democracies for generations and 
often serve to justify violent acts or terror groups such as 
ETA terrorism in Spain, which I call “unconsolidated 
pockets.” This is particularly true in regimes in which insti-
tutions continue with the same personnel and actors in 
place, “converting” to democrats overnight, but not allow-
ing these institutions they represent to deal with their own 
past. The removal of the Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon in 
2012 after his attempts to take cases of Franco era crimes to 
the higher courts, is just one of many examples which show 
the shadow that the former Franco regime casts over the 
current administration and judiciary. Successors of 
Franco’s elites played a crucial role in avoiding any pros-
ecution of past perpetrators. Continuing ETA terrorism 
and violent separatist movements in the Basque Country, 
Catalonia, and elsewhere are also a sign that the country 
never successfully delegitimized the past (Aguilar 2001). 
Such activists claim that because of Franco’s unsettled leg-
acy, they are still not “free and independent” and that “cen-
tralistic autocratic power” remains in Madrid. Those who 
support terrorism and separatism often justify their claims 
in terms of the unjust legacy that still “impacts Spanish 
political elites” in their decision-making processes. Here, 
transitional justice measures could have served as a catalyst 
to demystify these legacies. This could have helped to avoid 
the ongoing violent acts, because ETA would not receive 
such widespread support based on myths and false legacies.
Although the absence of transitional justice measures alone 
does not automatically lead to the complete failure of 
democratic institutions, it is linked to the level of effective 
performance of those institutions which, in turn, affects 
the legitimacy and quality of democratic institutions.
In the case of Turkey, the ECtHR has been one of the main 
international legal institutions pressurizing Ankara to 
address past crimes. Cases of disappeared and murdered 
Kurds in eastern Anatolia or Greeks in Northern Cyprus 
have come before the ECtHR. The government responded 
to the judgments by initiating legal and political reforms 
and setting up compensation funds for victims (Brems 
2011). The ECtHR is by no means the only transitional jus-
tice measure for Turkey, but it has contributed to the pro-
cess by ruling, for example, that Turkey must set up a 
reparation fund for property seized from Greek Cypriots 
during the conflict in 1974. Kurdish victim groups have 
repeatedly used the decisions of the ECtHR to pressure 
Ankara for more reforms. In response, the Turkish parlia-
ment launched investigative laws in the case of the dis-
appeared Kurds. In other cases, the government appointed 
a Commission of Inquiry for reparations and for Greek 
property losses in Northern Cyprus. This took place 
shortly before the accession talks to the EU in 2004 (Loizi-
dou v. Turkey Case No. 15318/89, ECtHR, 1996-VI, no. 
26.). These were all responses to international pressure 
using transitional justice measures as a tool to leverage 
democratic performance. Because of this, citizens perceived 
a general increase in transparency and accountability of 
institutions, which, in turn, encouraged them to file more 
claims. The relatively slow progress of democracy in Turkey 
has, by and large, benefited from the few transitional jus-
tice measures so far (Mihr 2012). Henceforth, if inter-
national organizations, government, and civil society 
cooperate and apply a mix of transitional justice measures 
over a period of time, the impact on the performance of 
democratic institutions will be discernible.
3. Transitional Justice and the Quality of Democracy
Transitional justice measures can contribute to and/or 
serve as a catalyst for the democratic performance of insti-
tutions. Democracies that are considered to be very effec-
tive are those which have stable institutional structures that 
ensure the liberty of citizens through the legitimacy and 
functionality of their mechanisms. Thus, quality democ-
racy is a regime that satisfies citizens’ needs and has the full 
backing of civil society (Morlino 2010, 213). To draw 
further links between transitional justice and the quality of 
democracy, one has to see that on the one side, these 
measures can facilitate, catalyze, and contribute to demo-
cratic reforms, and on the other side, the more democratic 
a society becomes, the more likely it is to institute transi-
tional justice measures to come to terms with its past. 
Thoms, Ron, and Paris found that transitional justice 
measures can have an impact or correlation, at least on 
respect for human rights, adherence to the rule of law, 
regime legitimacy, and diversity, and consequently the per-
formance of democratic institutions (2010, 329–42). Indi-
cators used by Morlino (2010) to measure the quality of 
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democracy can be grouped into criteria that are similar to 
those of the transitional justice process. For example: insti-
tutional accountability and governmental response 
through legal reforms, commissions and trials; trans-
parency through memorials, commissions; assurance of 
freedom and equal rights through independent judicial and 
legislative powers; and political participation through vic-
tim groups. High levels of citizen trust through engage-
ment and participation as well as a sincere guarantee of 
fundamental human rights, are further indicators. Some 
direct links were given in the above-mentioned examples, 
such as 1) the level of responsiveness and thus accountabil-
ity of institutional powers towards victims, perpetrators, 
civil society organizations claims and needs in respect to 
the past; 2) the level of independence and transparency of 
the judiciary to uphold fundamental freedom and human 
rights when making decisions over past wrongdoings; or 3) 
the level of participation and engagement, and thus civic 
trust, by citizens, victims, or perpetrators in state institu-
tions; to mention but a few (Altman and Perez-Linan 2002; 
Lijphart 1999; Diamond and Morlino 2005).
Parallel to any “wave of democratization” (Huntington 
1991; Lipset 1959), the rise of human rights awareness and 
transitional justice mechanisms in the 1990s influenced 
the assessment of democracy in general. This has led to 
the idea that instead of measuring only the consolidation 
of democracy, the “quality of democracy” would be a 
better way to classify democracy and its institutions 
(Schmitter and Guilhot 2000; Diamond and Morlino 
2005); alternatively “effective democracy” as Ingelhart and 
Welzel argue (2005). Knudsen adds that transitional jus-
tice measures can trigger egalitarian distribution of power 
over collective decision-making among citizens (2010, 
111–12). Although this does not say anything about insti-
tutional quality and thus the level of accountability, trans-
parency, or participation, transitional justice measures 
have to be seen again as facilitators and catalysts (but not 
more than this).
Meanwhile, measuring the quality of democracy has 
become a separate field of empirical investigation. It is 
assumed that quality, resilience, robustness, or simply best 
practices or good governance are relevant criteria to dis-
tinguish weak, stable, defective, and consolidated democ-
racies. But although criteria and indicators for assessment 
have changed over the past decade, the core aspects of 
democratic consolidation remain and are found in the 
good governance principles of a high level of governmental 
accountability, transparency, and citizen participation 
(Diamond 1999; Huntington 1991; Gunther, Diam-
andouros, and Puhle 1995, 7; Linz and Stepan 1996; 
Schmitter 2005; O’Donnell, Cullen, and Iazzetta 2004). 
This observation by more than just a handful of 
researchers is pivotal because some of the “classical assess-
ments” of consolidated democracy ignore significant issues 
such as “unconsolidated pockets” in their analytic frame-
work of democracies, as explained above. It is within these 
“unconsolidated pockets” that minority, ethnic, religious, 
linguistic, or ideological groups seek a change of political 
regime, territorial separation, or greater autonomy through 
often undemocratic and violent means. What connects 
these “unconsolidated pockets” to transitional justice is 
that these groups often “justify” and legitimize their activ-
ities in terms of unsettled claims from the past – often cen-
turies ago – and in doing so refer to past unjust and 
autocratic regimes that, they assert, ignored their claims or 
concerns. These actors and their constituencies perceive 
that justice has not succeeded and that the legacy of the 
past is still omnipresent in contemporary politics.
I therefore contest the assumption that fully consolidated 
democracies can have “unconsolidated pockets” over 
extended periods of time without affecting the general 
quality of the democratic regime, as in Spain for example. 
Old stereotypes, hatred, or mistrust towards former 
oppressors fuel violent groups and keep their con-
stituencies from engaging with, and trusting, regime insti-
tutions. These groups can gain a substantial number of 
supporters and sympathizers, which can consequently 
hamper democratic development. This applies to many 
violent movements in both democratic and autocratic 
states, such as ETA in the Basque Country, the IRA in 
Northern Ireland, FARC in Colombia, the separatist move-
ment in Quebec, or the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (Aguilar 
2001). To diminish such “unconsolidated pockets”, transi-
tional justice measures could catalyze these violent claims 
by demystifying legacies by revealing facts of past atrocities 
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for victimizers and victims alike. That, again, can lead to 
the recognition that many victims in society seek, and can, 
in return, prevent acts of vengeance and anti-democratic 
movements.
3.1. Responsiveness
As indicated earlier the level of accountability through 
responsiveness of state institutions is fundamental to 
assessing the quality of democracy. Support for democratic 
institutions, and thus their qualitative performance, is also 
based on the belief of citizens that courts and parliament 
protect and provide freedom and equality (Morlino 2010, 
215). As Linz and Stephan note in their analysis of support 
for democratic institutions in respect to responsiveness, 
only if the great majority of a population adheres to 
democracy and its institutions as “the only game in town” 
can a democracy be called, in our terms, quality democracy 
(Linz and Stephan 1996). The level of executive and legis-
lative responsiveness in liberal, consensual, or represen-
tative democracies depends on how governments balance 
public versus institutional interests and react accordingly. 
The balance among legal imperatives, public safety, and 
pragmatic considerations is nevertheless crucial in any 
transitional justice process (Olson, Payne, and Reiter 2010, 
154–55). The capacity and leadership of governmental 
institutions also determines how they respond to the needs 
of citizens. It is important to follow up some of the above-
mentioned dimensions and links when assessing respon-
siveness. For example, it is helpful to examine when and 
how political institutions and leaders formally acknowl-
edge past wrongdoings. In this respect, newly democratic 
regimes can decide to do anything from setting up com-
pensation funds to introducing memorial days (Kritz 2009, 
17). Governments and parliaments can respond to citizens’ 
claims by instituting restitution or reparation funds. Gov-
ernments respond to citizens’ or pressure groups’ claims by 
initiating rehabilitation or compensation funds for expro-
priations, imprisonment and loss of family members. They 
can also set quotas for public offices so that former com-
batants, victims, or minority groups are proportionately 
represented. Another way to respond to domestic or inter-
national claims is by providing public funding to restore 
buildings, convert them into memorials, or maintain his-
torical or religious sites. Many of these measures are 
already humanitarian obligations under the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 and are reiterated in the 2006 UN Basic 
Principles. Any legal reform of the penal code should con-
form to international human rights norms as defined in 
international conventions and statues. The same applies for 
governmental vetting and lustration processes. Investigat-
ing public officials’ records of collaboration with the 
former regime and taking the necessary action to restrict 
their influence on the new democratic regimes can be an 
active measure that a new regime can take to leverage 
accountability. By doing so, institutional powers combat 
impunity and launch reform of the security system. Thus, 
all of these varying dimensions of institutional responsive-
ness are dimensions of accountability and can enhance 
civic trust in the new democratic institutions.
Nevertheless, some of these procedures can perpetuate 
division within societies. They can result in unfair vetting 
and lustration processes (Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2010, 
329–42). Olson, Payne, and Reiter, as well as Van der 
Merwe, Baxter, and Chapman conclude that dealing with 
past injustices can provide a rationale and momentum for 
the new government to reform institutions and ideologies, 
and while this may help society to move forward, it can 
also impede it (Olson, Payne, and Reiter 2010; Van der 
Merwe, Baxter, and Chapman 2009, 19). If these measures 
are applied in isolation, separate from other measures, 
without the consent of victim groups, and with the aim of 
installing victors’ justice instead of a broader social justice, 
this can lead to functional failure of the institution or 
trigger corruption. Others, such as Barahona de Brito, 
Gonzalez-Enriquez, and Aguilar, or Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 
find no clear evidence (for example in case studies in Latin 
America or Africa) that directly links transitional justice 
measures to democracy, although they do not deny that 
they can be linked through what they call “indirect ways” 
and what I would call long-term spiral-correlating inter-
linkage (Barahona de Brito, Gozalez-Enriquez, and Aguilar 
2004; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2009).
3.2. Transparency and Independence through Transitional Justice
The more independently courts, tribunals, and the local 
judiciary can operate, the greater their impact on societal 
change and the functionality of democratic institutions. In 
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other words, the rule of law enhances transparency. Public 
trials and truth commission proceedings in the context of 
transitional justice are vital to this process. Independence 
of the judiciary and the rule of law is perhaps the most dif-
ficult mechanism for young democracies to establish, and 
for consolidated ones to uphold. Yet, the pursuit of retro-
spective justice is an urgent task of young and yet fragile 
democracy in order to delegitimize the previous regime. 
During the first few years after regime change, many transi-
tional justice measures can be used to legitimize new politi-
cal elites and political orders. These measures can highlight 
the fundamental character of the new order to be estab-
lished. Many people, for example in post-communist coun-
tries, never had any positive experience with fair and open 
trials. It is here where trials of past perpetrators can have 
an educational effect and show how the rule of law can 
contribute to democratic stability. Sooner or later, most 
governments will confront the dilemma of whether or not 
to undertake the prosecution of previous leaders or 
whether they leave the past behind with blanket amnesties. 
If they opt for a middle path – which most countries do – 
they have to carefully examine the kind of sanctions and 
penalties they apply. If the rule of law is taken seriously, the 
principle of nulla poena sine lege (barring prosecution for 
an act that was not criminal at the time it was committed), 
has to also be taken seriously. And this is why many of the 
crimes of the past are difficult to prosecute under new 
regimes (Kritz 1995, vol 2, xxxi–xxxii). They simply were 
not considered “crimes” under the old legislation, as seen 
in the trial of former Egyptian president Mubarak in 2012 
and 2013. Unless these crimes qualify as crimes against 
humanity, many governments in transition struggle with 
the dilemma, that after day X – when regime change took 
place – the rule of law should be applied, cannot necessary 
be applied retrospectively. One way to overcome this 
dilemma is to apply international (customary) human 
rights law, which applies universally. International human 
rights laws, norms, and standards are transparent and 
accessible to everyone and can be applied in any legal sys-
tem regardless of whether it is based on local, traditional, 
domestic, or international jurisdiction. Its vagueness is its 
strength, giving countries in legal terms a “margin of 
appreciation,” and thus the possibility to adapt inter-
national law to their own legal system according to their 
own legal or domestic traditions. The golden rule here is 
not to discriminate or harm others. But this is also where 
international human rights law often conflicts with tradi-
tional or domestic jurisdiction. For example, during the 
ongoing transitional justice process in Uganda women have 
largely been excluded from testifying in court. This is due 
to the tradition that women have no voice in court (Mib-
inge 2010). O’Donnell, Cullell, and Iazzetta highlight this 
correlation between the degree to which fundamental 
human rights are granted in the constitution and by the 
rule of law and the way democratic institutions function 
effectively. Traditional legal regimes or cultures that oppose 
modern human rights standards will most likely fail to 
reach a higher quality of democracy (O’Donnell, Cullell, 
and Iazzatta 2004, 59–69). Consequently, in order to score 
higher in quality performance, such new democracies have 
to balance international human rights norms and stan-
dards in their constitutions with domestic legislation and 
local and traditional judicial regimes. The more govern-
ments benefit directly by bringing former political oppo-
nents to justice, the more they will be willing to adapt their 
constitutions to international law. Yet, these measures 
depend on political agendas. The outcome of transitional 
justice processes can play directly into the hands of newly 
established governments. And in return, governments will 
be more likely to apply them if these measures help to 
delegitimize former opponents and increase their own 
legitimacy. Many authors who work in the field of quality 
of democracy share similar observations. Schmitter, as well 
as Bühlmann, Merkel, and Wessels, and others, for 
example, argue that beyond formal adherence to human 
rights norms, political leadership has to guarantee that 
these norms are applied in a transparent, accountable, and 
responsive way to citizens’ needs; otherwise they will be 
useless and ineffective (Bühlmann, Merkel, and Wessels 
2008). This is where transitional justice measures can play a 
catalytic role. Civil society, victims, bystanders, and victim-
izers must all enjoy the human rights to security, freedom 
of expression, and fair trials. Where these human rights are 
restricted, the likelihood of fair trials, reconciliation work-
shops, memorial initiatives, and negotiation of property 
rights and compensation, to give some examples, are all at 
risk and will mostly fail. The state and (new) political sys-
tem or order, however, has to have de facto control and 
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effective power to implement these measures. It has to 
guarantee both human rights and the safety of those who 
make demands (Bühlmann, Merkel, and Wessels 2008). 
This is far from the reality in many transitional societies. 
Some government leaders in new democracies refrain from 
pursuing a transitional justice process because they fear 
retroactive justice themselves. To better assess the expected 
outcome of transitional justice measures, a method called 
“evidence-based transitional justice,” meaning to bench-
mark transitional justice measures against their anticipated 
outcome, for example, when it is expected that these 
measures will establish the rule of law, has been introduced 
(Pham and Vinck 2007, 232). That is to say, we can only 
assess the outcome, impact, or correlation of transitional 
justice measures on and with democratic institutions if we 
know what was expected by citizens or governments when 
they were initiated. In this assessment exercise, inter-
national human rights norms and standards can serve as 
guidelines to trigger regime change and to overcome old 
authoritarian, radical, and traditional rules and regulations 
that once led to injustice and atrocities (McLaren 2010, 
240). In negotiated or “pacted” transitions toward democ-
racy, military elites often wait to reassert themselves, ham-
pering the country’s democratically elected leaders if they 
seek to address past crimes (McAdams 2001, 239). Gener-
ous blanket amnesties are often passed, as seen in the case 
of Spain, although conditional amnesties are often con-
sidered a compromise to avoid impunity on the long term 
(Alonso and Muro 2011).
3.3. Participation, Civic Trust, and Engagement
In their assessment of the quality of democracy in Latin 
American countries, Altman and Perez-Linan used Dahl’s 
basic dimensions of quality of democracy, which focus on 
citizens’ participation and engagement and thus the level 
of civic trust. First, in order for citizens to participate and 
engage with democratic institutions, human rights have to 
be guaranteed and monitored at least to minimum stan-
dards. A “free exercise of political contestation” ought to be 
guaranteed that, in return, impede accountability and 
transparency (Altman and Perez Linan 2010, 89). 
Obviously, democratic institutions that fail to guarantee 
these rights will face mistrust and a loss of legitimacy over 
time. Vertical accountability such as citizen’s participation 
becomes a central dimension as it grants individual citizens 
and organized civil society actors the means of control over 
politicians and political institutions (Diamond and Mor-
lino, 2005, xiii). If citizens feel free to participate in deci-
sion-making processes they are more likely to ask for 
transitional justice measures as one way to attain their 
goals of acknowledgement, truth, and compensation. Pru-
dent governmental responsiveness increases citizens’ par-
ticipation, and along with that civic trust. That is to say, it 
increases the confidence of citizens to engage with and 
make use of public institutions. In response, citizens’ con-
cerns are taken seriously and dealt with by state bureau-
cracy. The variable of “civic trust” in this context is pivotal, 
in line with Putnam’s argument that the greater the par-
ticipation, the higher the civic trust in a democratic system 
(1993). That premise concurs with Tilly’s analysis, that in 
order to establish trust in democratic processes, the insu-
lation of categorical inequalities in public politics and the 
transformation of non-state powers to state powers are 
necessary to establish a protective relation between citizens 
and state (2007, 96). Although none of these statements are 
surprising, the main argument in this article is that if per-
petrators, victims, and bystanders gain confidence, they 
will make increased use of state institutions. Therefore, the 
interlinkage and correlation between the performance of 
democratic institutions and transitional justice measures 
depends largely upon the political expectations of, and par-
ticipation by citizens. But identifying a direct causal link is 
difficult. If transitional justice measures serve to catalyze 
citizens’ or victims’ claims and encourage active par-
ticipation that leads to solid democratic institutional per-
formance, it is probably the most we can expect. But, 
without a minimally functioning “formal” democratic 
institution, i.e. constitution, courts, bureaucracies, or 
executive powers, no transitional justice process is likely to 
take place at all.
4. Conclusion
Whether it is Linz and Stepan’s metaphors on “democracy 
being the only game in town” (1996, 5) or Hazan’s pre-
requisite of a “national catharsis” that has to be in place 
before starting a transitional justice process, both rely on 
the same presumption, that there has to be an overwhel-
ming majority in society – after regime change – that is 
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willing to come to terms with the past and at the same time 
to adhere to the concept of democracy. If this is the case, 
there can be a correlating effect between transitional justice 
measures and the quality of democracy. A majority of 
society generally speaking consists of two-thirds of a popu-
lation, according to Diamond (1999). This majority 
agreeds, at least in principle, that democracy is the system 
they want. But there is a short window of opportunity after 
regime change for setting the legal and political framework 
for future transitional justice measures; sometime the 
widow closes within a year or less, before old rivalries 
return. Thus, political decision-makers have to make sensi-
tive decisions during that period even if they only have a 
pre-vision of future transitional justice measures. In his 
quality assessment, Schmitter explains that we have to look 
at levels, frequencies, and timelines of societal par-
ticipation, as well as the extent to which public institutions 
respond to demands and needs or, instead, impose deci-
sions (Schmitter 2005, 28–29).
The inter-linkage, multi-causality, or rather correlation 
between transitional justice and quality of democracy dep-
ends largely on the level of responsiveness and accountabil-
ity of political elites, transparency, adherence to 
international human rights norms, and participation by 
citizens. Transitional justice measures can catalyze some 
citizens’ claims, political interests, and international norms, 
and as a “side effect” strengthen democratic institutions. 
This process is not limited to post-conflict scenarios 
because it can take decades, if not generations. Thus, transi-
tional justice measures are catalysts that can leverage demo-
cratic performance over a longer period of time, but they 
are not the only political, institutional or civic measures 
contributing to the quality of democracy. Others such as 
security or economic measures are crucial for any demo-
cratic development. But higher quality is generally achieved 
if governmental responsiveness and civic engagement, and 
thus trust, are merged with different transitional justice 
measures at different stages in the process of democracy. A 
mix of measures over a longer period of time, from both 
the domestic and international levels, is more likely to have 
a positive effect on democracy than a top-down or bottom-
up approach alone. But control over collective decision-
making is also where citizens’ claims for memorials and 
trials can contribute to the quality of democracy (Beetham 
1999, 90). In other words: the more control citizens or 
pressure groups have over the transitional justice process, 
the more it impacts the quality of democracy. The same is 
true for external pressure or incentives by the international 
community, which often trigger citizen’s demands. Thus, 
the crucial premise is that the more responsive and sensitive 
executive and legislative powers are to their citizens’ claims 
at any stage of transition, the more legitimized they will be 
– and the higher the quality of their democratic system.
IJCV : Vol. 7 (2) 2013, pp. XXX – XXX
Anja Mihr: Transitional Justice and the Quality of Democracy 312
References
Aguilar, Paloma. 2001. Justice, Politics, and Memory in the Spanish Transition. In 
The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, Studies 
in Democratization, ed. Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen Gonzalez-En-
riquez, and PalomaAguilar. 92–118, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Alonso, Gregorio, and Diego Muro, eds. 2011. The Politics and Memory of Demo-
cratic Transition: The Spanish Model. London et al: Routledge.
Altman, David, and Aníbal Pérez-Linán. 2010. Assessing the Quality of Democ-
racy: Freedom, Competitiveness, and Participation in Eighteen Latin Ameri-
can Countries. Democratization 9 , (2): 85–100.
Andrieu, Kora. 2011. An Unfinished Business: Transitional Justice and Democra-
tization in Post-Soviet Russia. International Journal of Transitional Justice 
5:198–220.
Barahona de Brito, Alexandra, Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez, and Paloma Aguilar, 
eds. 2004. The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing So-
cieties, Studies in Democratization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baxter, Victoria. 2009. Critical Challenges for the Development of the Transi-
tional Justice Research Field. In Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: 
Challenges for Empirical Research, ed. Hugo Van der Merwe, Vitoria Baxter, 
and Audrey Chapman, 13–22. Washington DC: USIP Press.
Beetham, David. 1999. Democracy and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity.
Beetham, David, Edzia Carvalho, Todd Landman, and Stuart Weir. 2008. Assess-
ing the Quality of Democracy: A Practical Guide. Stockholm: International 
IDEA.
Biddiss, Michael. 1995. Victors’ Justice? The Nuremberg Tribunal. History Today 
45 (5): 40–46.
Brems, Eva. 2011. Transitional Justice in the Case Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights. International Journal of Transitional Justice 5:282–303.
Bühlmann, Marc, Wolfgang, Merkel, and Bernhard Wessels. 2008. The Quality of 
Democracy: Democratic Barometer for Established Democracies, Working 
Paper 10a. Zurich: NCCR Democracy and University of Zürich.
Dahl, Robert A. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Davis, Laura. 2010. The European Union and Transitional Justice. Initiative for 
Peacebuilding. New York, International Center for Transitional Justice.
Diamond, Larry. 1999. Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, Larry, and Leonardo Morlino, eds. 2005. Assessing the Quality of 
Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Encarnación, Omar G. 2008. Reconciliation after Democratization: Coping with 
the Past in Spain. Political Science Quarterly 123 (3) (Sept. 2008), 435–60.
Freeman, Mark. 2006. Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Freeman, Mark. 2010. Necessary Evils, Amnesties and the Search for Justice. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frei, Norbert. 2002. Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Am-
nesty and Integration, trans. Joel Golb. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Graham, John, Bruce Amos, and Tim Plumptre. 2003. Principles for Good Gov-
ernance in the 21st Century, Policy Brief 15. Institute on Governance. 
http://iog.ca/
Gready, Paul. 2009. Telling Truth? The Methodological Challenges of Truth Com-
missions. In Methods of Human Rights Research, ed. Fons Coomans, Fred 
Grünfeld, and Menno T. Kamminga, 159–85. Antwerp: Intersentia.
Greiff, Pablo de. 2012. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, 
Justice, Reparation, and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence (A/HRC/21/46). Gene-
va: Human Rights Council.
Hazan, Pierre. 2006. Measuring the Impact of Punishment and Forgiveness: A 
Framework for Evaluating Transitional Justice. International Review of the 
Red Cross 88 (36): 19–47.
Henderson, Jennifer, and Pauline Wakeham. 2009. Colonial Reckoning, National 
Reconciliation? Aboriginal Peoples and the Culture of Redress in Canada. 
English Studies in Canada 35 (1): 1–26.
Herf, Jeffrey. 1997. Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys. Cam-
bridge, MA, et al: Harvard University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twen-
tieth Century. London: University of Oklahoma Press.
Ingelhart, Ronald, and Chris Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change, and 
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Kerslake, Celia, Öktem Kerem, and Philip Robins, eds. 2010. Turkey’s Engagement 
with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century. New York: Pal-
grave Macmillian.
Kiss, Csilla. 2006. The Misuses of Manipulation: The Failure of Transitional Jus-
tice in Post-Communist Hungary. Europe-Asia Studies 58 (6): 925–41.
Knutsen, Carl H. 2010. Measuring Effective Democracy. International Political 
Science Review 31 (2): 109–28.
Kritz, Neil, ed. 2004. Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with 
Former Regimes. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace.
Kritz, Neil. 2009. Policy Implications of Empirical Research on Transitional Jus-
tice. In Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical 
Research, ed. Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman, 
13–22. Washington D.C.: USIP Press.
Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance 
in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan, eds. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. 
Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press.
Lipset, Seymour A. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic De-
velopment and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review 
53:69–105.
Mayer-Rieckh, Akexander, and Pablo de Greiff, eds. 2007. Justice as Prevention: 
Vetting Public Employees in Trnsitional Societies, Advancing Transitional Jus-
tice Series. New York: Social Science Research Council.
McAdams, James A., ed. 1997. Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New 
Democracies. London: University of Notre Dame Press.
McAdams, James A. 2011. Transitional Justice: The Issue that Won’t Go Away. In-
ternational Journal of Transitional Justice 5:304–12.
McGann, Anthony. 2006. The Logic of Democracy: Reconciling Equality, Deliber-
ation, and Minority Protection, Michigan Studies in Political Analysis.: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press. 
McLaren, Lauren M. 2010. Constructing Democracy in Southern Europe: A Com-
parative Analysis of Italy, Spain and Turkey. London and New York: Rout-
ledge.
McMahon Patrice C., and David P. Forsythe. 2008. The ICTY’s Impact on Serbia: 
Judicial Romanticism meets Network Politics. Human Rights Quarterly 30, 
(2): 412–35.
Mibenge, Chiseche. 2010. Show Me a Woman! Narratives of Gender and Violence 
in Human Rights Law and Processes of Transitional Justice. Ph.D. diss., Utrecht 
University (Igitur Archive).
Mihr, Anja. 2012. Transitional Justice and The Quality of Democracy – From 
Democratic Institution Building to Reconciliation. In Transitional Justice: Be-
tween Criminal Justice, Atonement, and Democracy, SIM Special 37, ed. Mihr, 
Anja: 11–52. Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Utrecht University.
Mihr, Anja. 2013. Turkey, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation. In Encyclopedia 
of Transitional Justice, vol. 1, ed. Stan Lavinia and Nadya Nedelsky. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Morlino, Leonardo. 2010. Legitimacy and the Quality of Democracy. Inter-
national Social Science Journal 196: 211–22.
O’Donnell, Guillermo, Jorge Vargas Cullell, and Osvaldo M. Iazzetta. 2004. The 
Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications. London: University of Notre 
Dame Press.
Olson, Tricia D., Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter. 2010. Transitional Justice 
in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy. Washington DC: US Insti-
tute of Peace.
Peskin, Victor. 2005. Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the 
Winners at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda. Journal of Human Rights 4 (2): 213–31.
IJCV : Vol. 7 (2) 2013, pp. XXX – XXX
Anja Mihr: Transitional Justice and the Quality of Democracy 313
Pham, Phuong, and Patrick Vinck. 2007. Empirical Research and the Devel-
opment and Assessment of Transitional Justice Mechanisms. International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 1:231–48.
Powell, Bingham G. 2005. The Chain of Responsiveness. In Assessing the Quality 
of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
Priban, Jiri, Pauline Roberts, and James Young, eds. 2003. Systems of Justice in 
Transition: Central European Experience since 1989. Ashgate.
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern 
Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Quinn, Joanna R. 2009. Haiti’s Failed Truth Commission: Lessons in Transitional 
Justice. Journal of Human Rights 8 (3): 265–81.
Rigby, Andrew. 2000. Amnesty and Amnesia in Spain. Peace Review 12 (1): 73–79.
Roehrig, Terence. 2009. Executive Leadership and the Continuing Quest for Jus-
tice in Argentina. Human Rights Quarterly 31 (3): 721–47.
Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. 1998. Truth Commissions and Amnesties in Latin Ameri-
ca: The Second Generation. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American So-
ciety of International Law) 92:313–16.
Root, Rebecca. 2012. Transitional Justice in Peru. London et al: Palgrave.
Schabas, William, and Nadia Bernaz. 2012. Routledge Handbook of International 
Criminal Law. London et al: Routledge.
Schmitter, Philipp. 2005. The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability. In Assessing 
the Quality of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino. Baltim-
ore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Schmitter, Philippe, and Nicolas Guilhot. 2000. From Transition to Consoli-
dation: Extending the Concept of Democratization and Practice of Democ-
racy. In Democratic and Capitalist Transition in Eastern Europe, Geojournal 
Library 55, ed. Michel Dobry, 131–46. Springer.
Spinner-Halev, Jeff. 2007. From Historical to Enduring Injustice. Political Theory 
35:574–97.
Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Do-
mestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skaar, Elin. 2011. Judicial Independence and Human Rights in Latin America: Viol-
ations, Politics, and Prosecution. London et al: Palgrave Macmillan.
Spinner Halev, Jeff. 2012. Enduring Injustice. Cambridge University Press.
Stan, Lavinia, ed. 2008. Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union: Reckoning with the Communist Past. New York: Routledge.
Tanaka, Yuki. 2002. Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution dur-
ing World War II and the US Occupation. Routledge, London.
Thoms, Oskar N.T., James Ron, and Roland Paris. 2010. State-Level Effects of 
Transitional Justice: What Do We Know? International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 4:329–54 (Special Issue: Transitional Justice on Trial – Evaluating Its 
Impact).
Tilly, Charles. 2007. Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
UN Doc GA Resolution 60/147. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law indicates that TJ measures are a factor aiding democratization processes 
and democracy, GA Resolution 60/147, 21 March 2006.
Van der Merwe, Hugo, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman, eds. 2009. As-
sessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research. 
Washington, D.C.: USIP Press.
Vlaming, Frederick de. 2012. No Luxury to Set an Agenda: The Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal’s Prosecutorial Policy Towards Transitional Justice. In Transitional Justice: 
Between Criminal Justice, Atonement and Democracy, ed. Anja Mihr, 53–82. 
SIM Special 37, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Utrecht University.
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Eric. 2009. Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The 
Impact on Human Rights and Democracy (Security and Governance). Rout-
ledge, Chapman & Hall.
Anja Mihr 
a.mihr@uu.nl
